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Perspectives on Financial Innovation
ABSTRACT
The European Currency Unit (ECU) was officially introduced in
March 1979 and has joined the ranks of innovative financial
products that are rapidly appearing. The purpose of the paper is
to explore the properties of the ECU and analyze those
characteristics of the ECU, and products denominated in ECU, that
offer value—added. Changes in communications and information
technology, changes in the regulatory climate, and changes in the
macroeconomic environment have generally encouraged recent
financial innovations. We argue that the ECU has gained an edge on
its component currencies because of its portfolio properties, its
role in reducing transaction costs, the role of the European
Monetary System, and trading factors peculiar to the ECU. Private
participants should continue to gravitate toward the ECU as a
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212—285—8924I. Introduction
Over the last decade, a process of financial innovation has
enveloped the United States and other industrial countries. While
the details differ country by country, there are several common
features including (i) the development of new financial products
and markets, (ii) a greater tendency toward market—determined
interest rates, and (iii) increased competition among financial
institutions..J' In any newly formed or newly competitive market,
one expects to find a flurry of new products and new strategic
alliances during the development phase followed by a shakeout
period. This cycle is then repeated until the market reaches
steady—state maturity and the surviving markets and products have
been identified.
The European Currency Unit (ECU), a basket of ten European
currencies, is part of this modern tradition of financial
innovation. Since its official introduction in March 1979, the ECU
has made its presence felt in numerous financial markets: the
interbank market, the short—term deposit market, the Eurobond
market, the Euronote and syndicated credit markets, the currency
swap market, and the organized ECU futures and options markets.
Such widespread use may itself be a signal of success. But in a
highly dynamic and competitive setting, one cannot help but wonder
whether the ECU, a ttcurrency created by a committee," is merely an
"institutional curiosity" that is likely to fade from view once
its novelty has worn off. Or, is the ECU another example of a
financial innovation with lasting promise?
1The purpose of this paper is to explore the properties of the
ECU and then to analyze those characteristics of the ECU and
products denominated in ECU that offer value-added, and thus
enhance the future of the ECU. We begin from a theoretical
perspective by examining the general process of financial
innovation. The objectives of financial innovation are reviewed
along with those factors which enhance the likelihood of
innovations. A taxonomy for classifying innovations is presented.
The role of transaction costs receives special attention as an
explanation for many of the new financial instruments and
applications.
We then turn to consider the ECU itself as a new financial
instrument. We analyze the channels through which the ECU will
contribute value added if the ECU remains a "foreign currency."
Here we focus on the ECU's portfolio properties, its role in the
European Monetary System (EMS), and again the role of transaction
costs, all of which make the ECU useful in numerous applications.
Other attributes of the ECU that may detract from its usefulness
(e.g. its open basket nature that engenders recomposition and
realignment risks) are also examined.
Obviously, if the political decision is made to elevate the
status of the ECU to a parallel currency and legal tender in all
EEC countries, then the future of the ECU is assured and a full
line of ECU-financial products will result. However, even if the
ECU remains a parallel currency and a "foreign currency" (West
Germany now being the major hold—out), the ECU offers many market
participants substantial advantages relative to individual
component currencies. These advantage arise because of the
2potential depth of the ECU market relative to smaller component
currency markets, the stability of the ECU relative to its
component currencies, and the role of reduced transaction costs.
These advantages should persist even as foreign exchange controls
are relaxed in individual countries. Unless specific barriers are
placed around the ECU, its use should expand, which in turn will
promote further use and further tightening of the linkages across
European financial markets.
II. Theoretical Aspects of Financial Innovation
A. Functions of International Financial Markets
According to Dufey and Giddy (1981), innovation takes place
in international financial markets when it becomes profitable to
better fulfill any of the major functions of the international
financial sector. Dufey and Giddy cite four such functions:./
(1) To provide appropriate instruments for effecting
payments in individual currencies.
(2) To facilitate monetary exchanges between currencies.
(3)To develop institutions and markets that enable the
flow of savings towards investments across national
boundaries.
(4)To provide mechanisms for allocating, diversifying
and compensating for risk.
B. Alternative Taxonomies
Financial market innovations take many forms and it will be
useful to have a classification system. Dufey and Giddy propose a
division between "aggressive" and "defensive" innovations. The
former refers to new financial products or services offered in
response to a perceived demand that is currently not satisfied.
The latter refers to innovations that follow from changes in
3customer demand patterns or changes in relative costs. Dufey and
Giddy argue that in the financial services industry, aggressive
innovations should be random and relatively infrequent. Most
financial innovations are defensive ——aimedat either
circumventing government regulations or taken in response to
relative price changes or relative risk changes among previously
available financial instruments. Government policies ——in
particular, regulations that are not applied uniformly across
all parties or countries, and tax rates that are not applied
uniformly across different sources and uses of income ——provide
a fertile ground for the innovative process.
Another well—known taxonomy is the distinction between
"product" and "process" innovations. New financial products
include such diverse entries as exchange—traded currency options,
zero—coupon bonds, and stock indexfutures.-I Examples of process
innovations could include the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunications) network for foreign
exchange payments, the grey market (or pre—market) in Eurobond
trading, and the establishment of formal linkages and dual
listings between U.S. and foreign stock and commodity exchanges.
Applying this taxonomy to the ECU, clearly the ECU is a product
innovation. The ECU is the primary innovation and other ECU-
denominated instruments are derivative of this basic innovation.
But as the ECU plays a key role in the EMS, it is also part of a
process innovation intended to stabilize European exchange rates.
Related arrangements, such as the ECU clearing system, are
derivative process innovations designed to facilitate the use of
the ECU.
4The theory of finance suggests a third approach for
understanding the recent wave of financial innovations. Agents in
financial markets are typically characterized as risk—averse
utility maximizers. To optimize with respect to risk, agents will
desire the flexibility to hedge against any contingent risk. If
the available set of financial assets do not "span" all possible
contingencies, then agent utility might be improved by the
creation of securities whose payoffs depend on these
contingencies. The introduction of interest rate futures, heating
oil and crude oil futures, and mortgage—backed securities might be
seen as products that help complete the menu of financial products
thus allowing agents to reach their desired exposure to particular
risks. Some of these innovations may be viewed as "unbundling"
existing financial products (e.g. a forward contract might be
split into the combination of a put and call option, and a U.S.
Treasury security might be split into its CATS and STRIPs
components)../ Other new products represent the creation of
tradable claims based on previously existing financial positions
(e.g. mortgage-backed securities {GNNAsJ, and automobile loan
backed securities [CARS] )./
Tooptimize with respect to expected returns, agents will
take into account taxes and the transaction costs of managing
their positions. Many financial products (e.g. money market
mutual funds, stock index options and convertible bonds) represent
a composition or tIbundlingI of more elementary financial
instruments. Agents are attracted to these composite products
largely because they lower the cost of establishing and
5maintaining a desired position, or because they assist small
investors to attain scale economies, which again lowers the cost
of financial services, including professional management expertise.
C. Economic Environment
The pace of financial innovation is heavily influenced by
factors within the economic environment. Obviously, technological
change, in particular the development of computer hardware and
software, has dramatically changed the types of financial products
and services that are feasible. Advances in communications
technology that make it possible to link market participants and
the markets themselves have also changed the nature of products
and services that can be offered.
The relationship between regulatory change and financial
innovation is two-way and difficult to detail. The presence of
regulations that call for information disclosure and insure the
enforcement of contracts may promote entry into the financial
services industry, promoting competition and innovation.
"Excessive" regulation may be a two—edged sword ——onthe one
hand, it may delay certain types of innovations; on the other
hand, it has often encouraged innovation in order to avoid
regulatory constraints. The trend of the last decade toward
deregulation has certainly lengthened the list of market
participants and the menu of products that may legally be offered.
Deregulation has clearly added to the pressures for market—
determined interest rates and products tailored to customer
demands. As nations have reduced regulations on the international
movement of capital, international financial innovations and
linkages across markets have been encouraged.
6Macroeconomic changes may have contributed the sufficient
condition for the rise of financial innovation. The increase in
inflation rate, interest rate and exchange rate volatility since
1973 has been well-documented elsewhere.-/ This change in
volatility changed the relative risk/return trade-of fs for
financial products available in the l970s. Individuals,
corporations and governments queued up to buy risk—reducing and
return—increasing products. Seeing the huge incentives, the
financial services industry naturally responded to meet (if not
stimulate) the demand for new products.
D. The Role of Transaction Costs
Many models of macroeconomic behavior develop their results
abstracting from the presence of transaction costs. Such omissions
are often appropriate for the task, but students are sometimes
left with the notion that transaction costs are of little or no
importance within an economy. This inference could hardly be
further from the truth --ina world in which the cost of
transacting were zero, many commonplace economic phenomena would
not exist. The existence of money, the distortions associated with
monopolies, and the like cannot be explained without appealing to
some cost of negotiation, search, information, enforcement, or
other forms of transaction costs. And many parity conditions,
which often play an important role in macroeconomic models, need
not hold exactly if arbitrage is costly.2)'
In the area of financial products and services, it is easily
demonstrated that transaction costs play an important role for
both large and small players in the markets. A variety of powerful
7financial products exist because they can establish equivalent
financial positions at lower cost than another set of
transactions. Several examples may be useful to establish this
point.
Open—end mutual funds are financial products that allow
investors to attain higher returns, greater diversification, and
easier access to professional management at lower cost. A money
market mutual fund pools funds from many smaller investors,
enabling them to capture the higher yields on large-denomination
certificates of deposit, especially those issued in the Euro-
dollar market.!! An equity market mutual fund also pools funds
permitting small investors to acquire diversification gains for
less than if they purchased individual securities directly. As
long as there are scale economies in transacting, the cost—saving
advantage of mutual funds should persist.
An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a claim issued by a
U.S. bank representing an underlying share of foreign equity.
Rather than incur the expense of long—distance communication,
foreign language translation, currency conversions on purchase of
shares and dividend payments, and the like, associated with a
foreign stock purchase, a small American investor can simply
purchase an ADR share in U.S. dollars. The depositary bank will
handle all related dividend payments, rights offerings and so
forth on behalf of the ADR shareholder.
For larger institutional investors, stock index futures are a
new product that should offer appeal. Efficient portfolio
selection rules could lead a large institutional investor to hold
8some combination of a large, well—diversified asset portfolio
(say, the Standard and Poors [S&P] 500) and another portfolio of
risk—free government securities. To manage portfolio risk around
target levels, or attempt to exploit stock or bond market rallies,
the institution might find itself buying (or selling) large blocks
of equity shares against government securities. Clearly this
strategy could entail large trading costs, even assuming that
large block—trades have no impact on the prices of the securities.
The same risk—management and timing goals could be achieved
through buying and selling futures contracts on the institution's
portfolio of risky securities, in this case, the S&P 500 Index. In
all likelihood, the brokerage cost of trading and the disruption
in individual securities prices would be substantially less with
this strategy.
Finally, forward exchange contracts, used by the very largest
corporations, owe their existence to transaction costs. In the
absence of transaction costs, there would be no need for forward
contracts as forward positions could be created through a
combination of borrowing and lending in two currencies ——aswap
arrangement. With transaction costs and an active demand for
forward cover, banks find it advantageous to quote forward rates
(bid and offer) within the range predicted by the cost of
borrowing and lending funds.!' Lower transaction costs are at the
heart of the forward contract.
III. The ECU as a Financial Innovation
While there are a growing variety of ECU-denominated
financial products (e.g. deposits, futures, options, bonds, etc.),
9in this section we argue that the ECU itself is the only true
financial innovation. The success of the numerous ECU—denominated
instruments depends critically on the success of the ECU "as
money." LP-/ If the ECU fails to perform the services of money,
then it seems unlikely that any ECU-denominated product, no matter
how cleverly engineered, is likely to find a market niche. The
"moneyness" of the ECU is the key factor.
A. Status of the ECU as Currency
The status of the ECU reflects a mixture of official and
markets practices. This combination of de jure and de facto forces
is not unusual. The U.S. dollar is "legal tender" in the United
States, but the dollar is used extensively outside the United
States by mutual consent. For transactions between the central
banks of the countries participating in the ENS, the ECU enjoys
official recognition. These official ECU are created and circulate
under regulations formulated by the European Communities (EC)
Commission. All other ECU are designated private circulation ECU.
There are no supranational rules governing private ECU; each
country is free to set its own regulations.iJ' For countries
outside the EC, the ECU is clearly a foreign currency and subject
to all applicable foreign exchange controls and restrictions. For
member EC countries,the situation is more complicated. In these
cases, the ECU contains a mixture of both foreign and domestic
currencies ——astrict interpretation would conclude that national
regulations on capital export, minimum reserve requirements,
credit controls and so forth ought to be applied to (at least some
portion of) the ECU. Such rulings would run counter to the
10European Commission's interim goal of free mobility of the ECU as
a parallel currency.I
To address this issue, the EC has proposed that during an
initial phase, all EC countries should classify the ECU as a
foreign currency, thereby making it exempt from regulations
affecting national currencies. West Germany classifies the ECU as
an index or unit—of—account, making it illegal to denominate bank
liabilities or oother debts in terms of ECU.I For other EEC
countries, ECU are the equivalent of "Euro—ECU" and subject to
minimal regulation. As a consequence, in France and Italy, ECU are
preferred to domestic currency from the standpoint of regulatory
barriers. It could be argued that this asymmetric treatment offers
the ECU an unfair advantage over local currency, that will vanish
once these regulatory differences are removed.IV' We will return
to this point at the conclusion.
Another sensitive issue is that no central bank supervises
the circulation of private ECU and there is no lender-of-last-
resort in the system. Neither of these points need prove fatal for
establishing the critical level of moneyness for the ECU. The
development of other segments of the Eurocurrency market has
proceeded at a healthy pace guided by self-interest and self-
regulation; most likely the Euro-ECU market will follow suit. The
Basel Agreement would likewise suggest that all ECU banks banks
may readily draw on their parent domestic central bank should
lender—of—last—resort facilities be required.
In both its official and private capacity, the ECU carries
out the traditional functions of money ——mediumof exchange, unit
of account and store of value.i-/ At the official EC level, the
11ECU is used (1) to settle inter-governmental swap and credit
transactions, (ii) as a numeraire for budgets and exchange rate
parities within the EMS, and (iii) as part of official reserves of
EC central banks. In the private sector, the other papers in this
session confirm the wide variety of money-like roles played by the
ECU.
B. Value Added from the ECU
The ECU reflects a particular basket of ten European
currencies. In principle (and ignoring transaction costs, foreign
exchange controls, or other barriers), there is no financial
transaction possible using the ECU that would not also be possible
if we were restricted to using the ten component currencies.
Accepting this premise, the following question must be asked: What
features of the ECU, or of the economic environment, create value
for the ECU in comparison with the component currencies? In short,
"Why should the ECU exist?" The answer will also suggest how the
ECU will fare should there be a change in any of its features or
the economic environment. Our discussion may also shed light on
the prospects for other basket currencies (e.g. the Special
Drawing Right {SDR]). We offer four inter-related channels through
which the ECU gains an edge vis—a—vis its component currencies.
1. Portfolio Properties. Any basket of assets that are not
perfectly correlated will exhibit diversification properties, that
is the variability of the basket is less than the weighted sum of
variability in the components. It should be emphasized that the
ECU basket, unlike the SDR, contains only European currencies and
does not contain the U.S. dollar. As a result, the variability
12(i.e. risk) of an individual European currency vis-a-vis the ECU
is much smaller than it is vis—a-vis the U.S. dollar. Chart 1
reveals that this reduction in variability is as little as 35% for
the Swiss franc or as great as 85% for the Irish pound. The
variability of the ECU itself vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar will be
greater than for some European currencies and less than for
others. Chart 2 illustrates these results. For risk—averse agents,
transactions denominated in ECU would be preferred to other units
of account (of course, holding other factors constant).
2. Role of Transaction Costs. Any ECU position could be
replicated exactly by transacting in the ten individual
currencies. But the alternative would subject agents to ten times
as many transactions, transactions in several thinly traded
markets, and transactions in fractional or odd amounts. All of
these factors would greatly increase the cost of establishing a
basket position from the ground up rather than operating through
the ECU itself.
3. Role of the EMS. It might be argued that any basket of
currencies offers diversification gains and transaction costs
savings. Why then do we not observe the "M.A.S.K.",abasket of
the Mexican, Australian and South Korean currencies? One factor is
that the level of economic activity among these countries is
relatively low and there is no intention to harmonize
macroeconomic policies or smooth exchange rate movements.
Consequently, the MASK could be relatively volatile vis-a-vis its
constituents. Furthermore, would there be a natural source of
demand and supply for the MASK? There are no official linkages
between these governments, and probably very few business entities
13that have foreign exchange needs in MASK proportions.
The ECU, by comparison, has official recognition and the
weighting factors bear some relationship to the extent of economic
activity between the EC countries. Moreover, the EC has committed
itself to stabilize the ECU through the EMS and the ground rules
governing changes in the composition of the ECU. Finally, many
businesses generate a natural economic exposure i European
currencies. It can be demonstrated that the ECU basket is highly
correlated (90% level and above) with a variety of European
currency portfolios.i-/ Consequently, demand and supply for ECU
might readily result from existing economic transactions.
4. Trading Factors. Financial markets in several of the EC
countries are small, and consequently the range of financial
products and the availability of hedging services are likely to
lack substantial depth, breadth, and liquidity. By moving
transactions into the ECU market, agents may be able to trade a
wider range of products at more favorable terms than they might in
their domestic markets. However, some of these gains may be the
result of foreign exchange restrictions that have hampered the
development of financial market products, in particular forward
contracts for hedging purposes. The ECU offers a less restricted
path to a more competitive financial market. If foreign exchange
controls on domestic currency were relaxed, the advantage of the
Euro—ECU would be reduced. But the other advantages of size and
scale economies would continue.
C. Negative Features of the ECU
Earlier we noted that no single central bank manages the
14circulation of the ECU and that there is no single lender-of-last-
resort. These features do not appear to represent fatal short-
comings. However, other aspects of the ECU have aroused more
attention.
First, the ECU is an "open basket" of currencies rather than
a "closed basket." In an open basket, the currencies in the basket
and their weighting factors may change. In the case of the ECU,
new currencies may be added to the basket (e.g. the Greek drachina
entered the ECU in September 1984 and the Spanish peseta and
Portuguese escudo may enter within the next few years) and the
amounts of each currency in the basket are subject to change. The
procedures governing these changes are complex, but the overriding
objective is to insure the stability and credibility of the EMS
and the ECU. 17-I Nevertheless, agents who intend to use the ECU
for hedging specific underlying positions in the (ten) component
currencies will view the open basket concept as an element of
risk.
In addition, currency realignments within the EMS will effect
the relative importance of currencies within the ECU. Again, this
injects an element of risk for agents using the ECU to hedge a
fixed position. As a practical matter, both recomposition and
realignment risks appear to be small.
D. Product and Market Linkages
The development of the ECU has spawned numerous related
products also denominated in ECU. Because the ECU is a portfolio
of existing currencies, there will be obvious pricing
relationships between the ECU and products expressed in terms of
15component currencies. To the extent that there is a "real" market
in ECU products, their prices should fluctuate within the neutral
band given by the cost of reconstructing the ECU product from its
components. If this condition is met, no arbitrage profit
opportunities will be available by trading between the ECU and its
component currencies. Similarly, prices of related ECU products
(e.g. spot rates, forward rates, interest rates, put and call
option prices, and so forth) should satisfy the traditional parity
relationships to eliminate risk-free arbitrage profits.
To consider the pricing of one particulaar product, ECU bonds
would trade at a higher yield relative to a theoretical portfolio
of component bonds if the ECU bond market were relatively
illiquid. On the other hand, the yield on ECU bonds might be lower
relative to a theoretical portfolio of component bonds if
investors value the convenience of transaction cost savings of the
ECU. The data suggest that the former relationship (higher ECU
bond yields) was observed in the first few years of ECU bond
trading, while the latter relationship is now the case)/ ECU
bond yields may also diverge from the yield on a theoretical
portfolio if the market expects a redefinition of the ECU, and
this phenomenon has also been observed.!-/
IV. Conclusions and Implications
In this paper, we have argued that the major source of value
added for the ECU can best be viewed in its role as money. The
traditional services of money (medium of exchange, unit of
account, and store of value) are being utilized in both the
official and private sectors. Other ECU-denominated products (e.g.
futures, options and bonds) are derivative products that follow
16Itnaturallyti as the moneyness of the ECU is understood.
Whether the ECU ever becomes a common currency and the one
money of Europe involves many dimensions of analysis. The gains
from macroeconomic coordination and a unified currency area are
still the subject of intense debate, and these issues will be
treated in other papers in this volume by Thygesen and Edison.
Ultimately, establishing the ECU as a common currency is a
political decision, albeit one where there can be substantial
economic input. If the ECU is adopted as a common currency, it
will be because it is viewed as a beneficial financial innovation
that increases the availability of useful monetary services in
Europe. If this were to happen, clearly ECU products would
flourish, offering a strong balancing position vis—a—vis the U.S.
dollar.
However, even if the ECU does not reach this status and it
remains a "foreign currency," and a "parallel currency," the ECU
should continue as a growing feature of the market. As long as
Europe continues as an economic community with substantial
economic linkages, the component foreign exchange and financial
market instruments will be linked. Private participants seeking to
further reduce risks and transaction costs will gravitate toward a
European basket. The ECU, not the first entrant but the first to
receive substantial official and private sector support, should





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1. Germany and Morton (1985, p.743).
2. Dufey and Giddy (1981, P. 33).
3. Dufey and Giddy (1981) argue that financial services are
experience goods (in the sense of Nelson [1970]) implying that
individuals must purchase and consume the goods before it can
be evaluated. Since the risk/reward implications of a new
financial product may be difficult to ascertain, individuals
may rely heavily on those institutions with a reputation for
producing new and successful products.
4. CATS are Certificates of Accrual on Treasury Securities,
similar to a zero—coupon bond, and STRIPs are Securities on
Treasury Registered Interest Payments, really the coupon or
interest component of a Treasury security.
5. GNMAs are securities issued through the Government National
Mortgage Association, whiles CARS are Certificates on
Automobile Receivables.
6. Germany and Morton (1985, p.744) also argue that the growth of
government budget deficits has been an important factor
encouraging financial innovation. The added volume of
government securities has added depth to these markets and
regulatory barriers have been reduced to facilitate their sale.
7. For further discussion on this point, see Frenkel and Levich
(1979)
8. Some of the yield differential reflects the fact that Euro-
deposits, and large denomination certificates of deposit are
not FDIC insured. In addition, money market mutual funds are
not obliged to hold balances in reserve at less than market
interest rates.
9. See Hilley, Beidleman and Greenleaf (1981) for an empirical
analysis on this point.
10. The ECU is not really a "new" product. Beginning in 1962, the
European Economic Commission introduced a series of "Units of
Account," which reflected numerous basket formulae. The
European Unit of Account (EUA) was introduced in 1975, and
replaced by the ECU in 1979. For a detailed review of the ECU's
forebearers, see Swiss Banking Corporation (1985, pp.14-16).
11. Swiss Banking Corporation (1985, p. 43).
12. Fratianni and Peters (1978, P. xx).
2013. Gerhard Stoltenberg, West German Finance Minister, recently
announced (Financial Times, September 22, 1986) that the West
German government was prepared to legalize investments in ECUs
provided that other EEC countries (notably France and Italy)
made suitable progress in liberalizing capital movements. The
ultimate decision to revise German law pertaining to the ECU
resides with the Bundesbank.
14. A similar argument was applied to the Eurobond market, which
developed in the l960s under the umbrella of various U.S.
capital market regulations (e.g. the Interest Rate
Equalization Tax and the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint
program). Some observers predicted the demise of the Eurobond
market once these controls were lifted in 1974. In 1984, new
issue volume in the Eurobond market was $79.5 billion, roughly
38 times as great as in 1974. See Levich (1985) and Morgan
Guaranty Trust (1985).
15. Beven (1985, p. 83).
16. Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1986, pp.19-21)
17. Swiss Banking Corporation (1985, pp.22-24)
18. Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1986, pp. 10-12)
19. Levich (1987, chapters 6 and 7).
20. Levich (1987, chapters 6 and 7).
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